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Curing Execution Errors and
Mistaken Terms in Wills
The Restatement of Wills Delivers New Tools
(and New Duties) to Probate Lawyers
By John H. Langbein
n recent years a remarkable change has been emergingin the way American courts treat cases involving
errors in the execution or mistakes in the content of
wills. When some innocuous blunder occurred in comply-
ing with the Wills Act formalities, such as when one
attesting witness went
to the washroom I ai afraid it's -4
before the other had
finished signing, the another case of
courts used to apply a
rule of strict compli- poor lrafting!
ance and hold the #.
will invalid. Likewise, in cases of mistaken terms, for
example, when the typist dropped a paragraph from the
will or the drafter misrendered names or other attributes
of a devise, the courts applied a no reformation rule; the
will could not be corrected no matter how conclusively
the mistake was shown.
Ironically, these intent-defeating results were reached in
the name of legal requirements that were meant to be
intent-serving. The various state Wills Acts require three
main formalities for attested wills-written terms, the tes-
tator's signature, and attestation by two witnesses. Wills
have to be given effect when the testator has died and is
unable to testify about what was intended. The formalities are
designed to generate and preserve highly reliable evidence of
intention. The requirement of written terms obliges the
testator to articulate his or her intention. Compliance
with the signature and attestation requirements pro-
vides evidence of genuineness and finality, while
cautioning the testator about the seriousness of the
document. In extreme cases the requirement that the
will be attested by disinterested witnesses may
also serve a protective function, to spare the tes-
tator from imposition.
The formalities are not difficult to comply
with, and cases of breach mostly arise when
the testator does not use counsel. What
should be the consequence in a case in which
the testator does not fully comply with the
Wills Act formalities, but the evidence is very
strong that the document was genuine and was
intended to be the will? Under the strict compli-
ance rule any formal breach, no matter how
innocuous, results in invalidity, hence in a conclu-
sive presumption that the will lacked testamentary
intent. The alternative that has grown in favor in
recent years is to treat the presumption of invalidity
as rebuttable, and to allow the proponent of the
defectively executed instrument to prove by an excep-
tionally high standard of proof (clear and
convincing evidence) that the testa-
tor intended the instrument
to be the will.
Cases involving omitted or mis-
taken terms raise a similar issue-
whether to restore to a will language that was
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have been included within the will but
was accidentally omitted or misren-
dered before the will was signed and
attested.
The Tiend Away from Formalism
Leading modem authority in a number
of American states has now reversed
the strict compliance and no reforma-
tion rules. Both by judicial decision and
by legislation, the courts have been
empowered to excuse harmless execu-
tion errors and to reform mistaken
terms. Section 2-503 of the revised
Uniform Probate Code, promulgated in
1990 and now adopted in several
states, treats a noncomplying will "as if
it had been executed in compliance
with [Wills Act formalities] if the pro-
ponent.., establishes by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the decedent
intended the document" as his or her
will. (This provision also applies to
cases of defective compliance with the
formalities for revocation, in which a
similar strict compliance rule was
applied.)
In some states in which such cura-
tive legislation is not in force, courts
have developed a judicial substantial
compliance doctrine. In In re Will of
Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991), the
New Jersey Supreme Court validated a
will in which the attesting witnesses
had failed to sign the will, because the
lawyer who supervised the execution
ceremony mistook the self-proving affi-
davit for the attestation clause and had
the witnesses sign only the affidavit.
Emphasizing that the purpose of the
Wills Act formalities is to implement
the testator's intent, the court said that
insisting on strict compliance in that
case "would frustrate rather than fur-
ther the purpose of the formalities."
The court reasoned that "when formal
defects occur, proponents [of the defec-
tively executed will should be allowed
to] prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the will substantially com-
plies with the statutory requirements."
A few years earlier, in In re Snide,
418 N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. 1981), the New
York Court of Appeal excused defec-
tive compliance with the requirement
that the testator sign the will. Snide
was one of the recurrent "switched
wills" cases, in which two testators,
usually husband and wife, execute
their wills simultaneously, but an inat-
tentive lawyer supervising the execu-
tion ceremony allows each testator
mistakenly to sign the will prepared
for the other. Each testator thus leaves
unsigned the will that he or she
intended to sign. The decisions before
Snide treated such wills as void. In
Snide the court excused the error. The
court rejected the contention that strict
compliance with the signature require-
ment of the Wills Act prevented reme-
dy for "a mistake so obvious." The
court did not order the unsigned will
to be probated under a substantial
compliance doctrine such as that in
Ranney. Rather, the court reformed the
mistaken terms of the will that the
decedent actually did sign. The hus-
band was the decedent, and the court
ordered the names in his will corrected
as he intended so that he left his prop-
erty to his wife and not to himself.
The Restatement
This movement to excuse harmless
execution errors and to reform mistak-
en terms in wills has now received
powerful reinforcement in the
American Law Institute's Restatement
(Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers. This Restatement is
appearing in installments as it wends
its way through the Institute's deliber-
ative process. The first two volumes,
published in final form in 1999 and
2003, cover the law of wills, will sub-
stitutes, and construction. Further vol-
umes covering class gifts and powers
of appointment are still in preparation.
The reporter and principal drafter is
Professor Lawrence W. Waggoner of
the University of Michigan Law
School, a leading academic authority
on probate law, who also served as the
principal drafter of the 1990 revision of
the Uniform Probate Code. The two
volumes of the Restatement now pub-
lished contain curative doctrines
empowering courts to excuse harmless
execution errors and to reform mistak-
en terms in wills.
Execution Errors
Section 3.3 of the Restatement deals
with execution errors, providing that
"[a] harmless error in executing a will
may be excused if the proponent estab-
lishes by dear and convincing evi-
dence that the decedent adopted the
document as his or her will." As does
the Uniform Probate Code's harmless
error rule, the Restatement rule also
applies to defects in compliance with
the revocation formalities.
A similar intent-serving provision
disapproves the older rule that forbids
a testator to alter by will the benefici-
ary designation in a will substitute
such as a life insurance policy.
Competent counsel will of course see
to it that the transferor complies with
the change-of-beneficiary requirements
in insurance policies and other non-
probate accounts, but laypersons act-
ing without counsel often think that a
will can trump a prior beneficiary des-
ignation. The Restatement rule (§ 7.2,
comment e) implements the testator's
intent in such cases but also protects
the financial intermediary from double
payment.
Mistaken Terms
Section 12.1 of the Restatement author-
izes courts to reform mistaken terms in
a will. The measure is based upon an
extensive body of supporting case law,
which the Restatement canvasses in its
Reporter's Notes. Section 12.1 provides
that a court may reform any donative
document, including a will, to "con-
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Wills thdve to be given effect when the
tes ator has diec andis u.t...e to
testify ab ut what was intended.
form the text to the donor's intention if
it is established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence (1) that a mistake of fact
or law, whether in expression or
inducement, affected specific terms of
the document; and (2) what the
donor's intention was."
The Restatement also endorses the
movement to allow courts to reform
wills, trusts, and other donative docu-
ments quite apart from instances of
mistake, in situations in which refor-
mation would achieve a tax objective
that the donor would have wished.
RESTATEMENT § 12.2 (extensive case law
is reviewed in the Reporter's Notes).
Why the Change?
The reorientation toward a more
intent-serving approach to the Wills
Act formalities is the product of many
influences. The scholarly literature that
has accompanied the change has
drawn attention to four main factors:
(1) the rise of the nonprobate system;
(2) experience in other jurisdictions;
(3) growing embarrassment that failure
to cure well-proved mistakes inflicts
unjust enrichment; and (4) concern to
spare lawyers from needless malprac-
tice liability.
Unifying the Law of Probate and
Nonprobate Transfers
Since World War II the use of nonpro-
bate modes of transfer on death has
burgeoned. Far more wealth now
flows through the main will substi-
tutes (inter vivos trusts, beneficiary
designations in pension accounts, life
insurance policies, and POD/TOD
accounts with banks, mutual funds,
and brokerage houses) than passes
through probate. A dominant theme of
law revision activity during this period
has been to unify the constructional
principles across the field of probate
and nonprobate transfers. Accordingly,
on topics ranging from the slayer
statutes (such as UPC § 2-803), to the
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, to
the statutes dealing with the effect of
divorce on prior wills and beneficiary
designations (such as UPC § 2-804),
the law has been changed to treat pro-
bate and nonprobate transfers alike.
The harmless error and reformation
rules now being applied to mistakes
in wills are part of this process of uni-
fication, because they are the rules
that have long applied in the nonpro-
bate system. Courts of equity have for
centuries exercised the power to
reform (to "rectify" in English law)
mistakes in trusts, deeds of gift, and
beneficiary designations. Likewise,
there is a well-developed doctrine of
excusing defective compliance with
the contractually required formalities
for change-of-beneficiary designations
in the nonprobate system for life
insurance policies and joint-and-sur-
vivor accounts. (The life insurance
substantial compliance cases are con-
veniently collected in Annot., 19
A.L.R.2d 5 (1951 & later supps.).)
The ostensibly new rules being rec-
ognized by the courts and endorsed
in the Restatement turn out, therefore,
to be quite old; what is new is apply-
ing them to wills as well as to will
substitutes. The principle being recog-
nized in the Restatement is that wills
and will substitutes entail a common
issue, ascertaining the intention of a
deceased transferor. The lesson of the
nonprobate system, now being
absorbed as the probate rule, is that in
cases of mistake in execution or mis-
taken terms, the purposes of the for-
mal requirements can be served by
allowing the proponent of the instru-
ment to prove by clear-and-convinc-
ing evidence that the testator intend-
ed the transfer.
Experience Abroad
Versions of the harmless error rule for
execution errors have been in effect for
decades in various Australian and
Canadian jurisdictions and in Israel.
The Uniform Law Commission
emphasized the successful experience
in these countries when promulgating
the harmless error provision of the
Uniform Probate Code (§ 2-503), as
did the American Law Institute in
explaining the thinking behind
Restatement § 3.3. Both groups pointed
out that a main lesson of the experi-
ence abroad was that the harmless
error rule did not breed litigation. Each
pointed to the report of an Israeli
judge, prepared for the British
Columbia Law Reform Commission,
which explained that the Israeli ver-
sion of the harmless error rule "actual-
ly prevents a great deal of unnecessary
litigation," because it "eliminates dis-
putes about technical lapses and limits
the zone of dispute to the functional
question of whether the instrument
correctly expresses the testator's
intent." UPC § 2-503, extracts in com-
ment; RESTATEMENT § 3.3, Reporter's
Notes. Persons who under the strict
compliance rule would benefit from
proving an intent-defeating technical
defect lose the incentive to do so,
because under the harmless error rule
the court will validate the will anyhow.
Experience with the harmless error
rule in Australia and elsewhere has
shown in what kinds of cases the rule
is invoked. The Restatement explains
that "a hierarchy of sorts has been
found to emerge among the formali-
ties. The requirement of a writing is so
fundamental to the purpose of the exe-
cution formalities that it cannot be
excused as harmless .... ." Similarly,
the reformation rule of Restatement
§ 12.1 would never validate an oral
will. Reformation is a rule of docu-
mentary practice, which conforms the
language of the document to what it
was meant to be.
Not only is the harmless error rule
never applied to excuse compliance
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The pri ciple being ecognized in the
Rest ent is th ills and will
sub itut s tail co
-
a ertain g e ntention oa
ecease tra eror.
with the writing requirement, it is also
virtually never applied to excuse com-
pliance with the signature require-
ment. One of the things that you are
free to do with a will that has been
drafted for you is to decide not to exe-
cute it. Failure to sign the will is sel-
dom harmless, because it raises a
grave doubt about whether the testator
intended the instrument to be his or
her will. Nevertheless, as we have seen
in Snide, the switched wills case, rare
circumstances can arise in which the
testator's failure to sign his or her will
("a mistake so obvious") should be
excused.
Consequently, almost all cases in
which the harmless error rule has been
applied have involved mistakes in
complying with the attestation require-
ments. The Restatement observes:
"Because attestation makes a more
modest contribution to the purpose of
the formalities, defects in compliance
with attestation procedures are more
easily excused."
Preventing Unjust Enrichment
When an innocuous execution error
defeats a will, or when a scrivener's
mistake defeats a devise, the failure to
implement the testator's intent not
only frustrates the testator's wishes,
but it also works unjust enrichment.
The devisee or distributee who takes
is unjustly enriched at the expense of
the intended beneficiary. Preventing
unjust enrichment is the central policy
value of the law of restitution. The
field of restitution emerged only in the
twentieth century as a result of the
fusion of law and equity, which
allowed the common principle of pre-
venting unjust enrichment to be gen-
eralized from the older law of quasi-
contract and constructive trust. The
modern understanding of the impor-
tance of avoiding unjust enrichment
has been an important stimulus to the
development of the rules curing harm-
less execution errors and reforming
mistaken terms.
Malpractice Liability
Although most execution blunders
occur when laypersons attempt testa-
tion without the help of counsel, cases
(such as Snide) do occur in which
counsel's negligence causes or con-
tributes to the error. By contrast, cases
of mistaken terms more often involve
a lawyer-drafter, who has misren-
dered instructions or omitted intended
terms. In these cases in which the
lawyer might be liable to the intended
beneficiaries for malpractice, it can be
argued that making available a reme-
dy to correct the mistake is unneces-
sary, because the curative doctrines
benefit the lawyer, who would other-
wise bear the malpractice liability.
There are, however, many objections
to this line of reasoning. Malpractice
liability does nothing about the cases
in which lawyers are not involved or
not culpable. When there is a lawyer to
sue, he or she may be wholly or par-
tially judgment-proof-for example,
when the lawyer is uninsured or
underinsured. For devises of unique
property, such as the family home or
the family Bible, relief in damages can-
not be adequate. Most importantly,
what is wrong with the malpractice
solution is that, by transforming the
mistake claim into tort, it neglects the
unjust enrichment intrinsic to mistake
cases. Whereas most forms of malprac-
tice cause deadweight loss that can
only be remedied by compensation, in
the testamentary mistake cases a bene-
fit is transferred from the intended
devisee to the mistaken devisee (or
intestate taker). Because the mistaken
devisee has no claim of entitlement, he
or she is unjustly enriched. The mal-
practice solution leaves the unjust
enrichment unremedied and instead
creates a needless loss to be charged
against the drafter. The mistake reme-
dies (harmless error, reformation)
respond to the simple truth that pre-




The Restatement provisions endorsing
the harmless error and reformation
rules for American law bring new
opportunities and responsibilities for
probate lawyers. The older conven-
tions of the strict compliance rule and
the no reformation rule are now open
to challenge everywhere. Lawyers pro-
cessing probate matters need to be
alert to the opportunity they now have
to raise issues that used to be fore-
closed. Sad cases of defeated intent
that used to be beyond hope are now
remediable, an innocuous formal
defect can be excused, mistaken terms
can be reformed, but only if counsel
sees the issue and brings it forward.
When confronting such cases,
lawyers will find the Restatement
(Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers to be a deep
resource. The Restatement is a work of
reference as well as authority, which
will guide the user to the case law, leg-
islative developments, and scholarly
literature. The Restatement covers the
entire law of wills, and it points to a
battery of constructional techniques
that can be used to resolve cases of
ambiguity (RESTATEMENT §§ 10-11)
without having to invoke the curative
doctrines of harmless error and refor-
mation that have been emphasized in
this article. M
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need to be alert to the opportunity
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